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I shall investigate Wittgenstein's view of the structure of 
justification comparing it to Foundationalism, Holistic Co-
herentism, and Contextualism. Remarks in On Certainty 
(1969) appear to commit Wittgenstein to each of these 
theories, and scholars have attributed each theory to him. I 
argue that Wittgenstein's remarks fit neither these theories, 
nor a sort of combination theory. Wittgenstein breaks new 
epistemological ground.  
The issue of the structure of justification arises from the 
regress problem. An inferential belief gets its justification 
from other beliefs, producing a belief chain. This chain, or 
regress, either continues indefinitely or ends. If it continues 
indefinitely, then it either goes on forever (Infinitism) or 
circles back upon itself (Linear Coherentism)--two prob-
lematic positions I will not discuss. If the regress ends, it 
ends in beliefs that are directly or non-inferentially justified. 
The regress problem thus delineates three possible struc-
tures, and four possible theories, of justification: an infinite 
chain of beliefs (Infinitism), a circular chain of beliefs 
(Linear Coherentism), and a finite chain of beliefs (Foun-
dationalism and Contextualism).  
1. Foundationalism 
For Foundationalists, justification is asymmetrical: basic 
beliefs justify inferential beliefs, but not vice versa. Foun-
dationalists argue that only a finite chain that ends in a 
basic belief can justify an inferential belief. Every alterna-
tive leads to skepticism.  
Wittgenstein has an asymmetrical theory of justification. 
Like contemporary Foundationalists and Contextualists, 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between two different types of 
beliefs, making one the foundation for the other. Avrum 
Stroll (2002 & 1994) and Roger Shiner (1980) argue that 
Wittgenstein is a kind of Foundationalist. David Annis 
(1978, foot note 3), Paul Moser (1985, chapter 2), and 
Louis Pojman (1999, p. 188) consider Wittgenstein a 
Contextualist.  
Like Foundationalists and Contextualists, Wittgenstein 
believes the regress of justification ends in basic beliefs. 
The activities of science require that certain things go 
unquestioned or "stand fast." As Stroll points out (1994, p. 
142), Wittgenstein uses explicitly foundational language in 
more than sixty passages (1969, 87-88, 94, 103, 110, 112, 
162, 166, 167, 204-205, 211, 225, 234, 245-46, 248, 253, 
295-96, 307-08, 337, 341, 343, 347-48, 353, 358-59, 370-
71, 380, 403, 411, 414-45, 449, 474, 475, 477, 492, 509, 
512, 514, 519, 558-60, 614, 670), all of which contain 
variations of the German words ”Grund" ("ground", "base", 
"bottom", "foundation"), "Fundament" ("foundation", "ba-
sis"), or "Boden" ("ground", "soil"). These include: 
"Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, 
comes to an end" (OC 204). 
"One cannot make experiments if there are not some 
things that one does not doubt… If I make an experi-
ment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus be-
fore my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not that" (OC 
337). 
"The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on 
the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, 
are as it were like hinges on which those turn. That is to 
say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations 
that certain things are in deed not doubted" (OC 342).  
"If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put" (OC 
343). 
Foundationalists see basic beliefs as self-sufficient: each 
stands on its own without support from others. These basic 
beliefs support a large and complex structure of inferential 
beliefs much as the foundation of a building supports the 
superstructure.  
Both critics (Stroll, 1994) and advocates of Foundation-
alism (Alston, 1976) argue that Foundationalism’s primary 
problem is that there are too few basic beliefs to support 
the large, complex superstructure. Instead of a pyramid, 
Foundationalism actually has the structure of an inverted 
pyramid (Stroll 1994, p. 144) liable to topple over at any 
moment. Wittgenstein avoids this problem because his 
"basic beliefs" are numerous and interconnected, forming 
a strong, ample groundwork for our inferential beliefs.  
2. Holistic Coherentism 
Holistic Coherentists, such as Quine (1953), BonJour 
(1985), and Nelson (1993), reject both the distinction 
between basic and inferential beliefs and the linear notion 
of justification presupposed by the regress problem. They 
maintain that all beliefs are epistemically equal and derive 
their justification from their place in our belief system. They 
also argue that while justification may appear linear in a 
particular case, this appearance is misleading. It overlooks 
the essential role of the entire belief system in justification. 
Wittgenstein often refers to our system of beliefs.  
"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a 
hypothesis takes place within a system. And this system 
is ... not so much the point of departure as the element 
in which arguments have their life" (OC 105).  
"When we first learn to believe anything, what we be-
lieve is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of 
propositions, (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)" 
(OC 141) 
"It is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a 
system in which consequences and premises give one 
another mutual support. (OC 142) 
"The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns 
to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a 
system of what is believed…" (OC 144) 
"Experience can be said to teach us these propositions. 
However, it does not teach us them in isolation; rather, it 
teaches us a host of interdependent propositions." (OC 
274) 
Were it not for the more than sixty foundational passages 
in On Certainty, scholars might take these holistic pas-
sages as evidence that Wittgenstein is a Holistic Coher-
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entist. When considered in combination with the founda-
tional passages, these holistic passages suggest that 
Wittgenstein has a sort of mixed theory. The problem of 
interpreting this combination of foundational and holistic 
passages has been discussed by a number of scholars, 
including Michael Williams (2001, p. 383) and Roger 
Shiner (1980).  
What is not clear from such passages is the extent and 
nature of the system. For while the Holistic Coherentists 
maintain that all of our beliefs form a giant network, 
Wittgenstein maintains that our "foundational beliefs" form 
a system of their own that supports our inferential beliefs. 
Thus, Wittgenstein both maintains the hierarchy of beliefs 
characteristic of Foundationalism (and Contextualism) and 
characterizes basic beliefs as interdependent and mutually 
supporting rather than as epistemically self-sufficient. This 
sets Wittgenstein’s theory apart from Foundationalism, 
Holistic Coherentism, and combinations of the two, such 
as Susan Haack’s Foundherentism (1999).  
3. Contextualism 
Because Wittgenstein stresses the importance of context, 
scholars such as David Annis (1978), Paul Moser (1985), 
Laurence BonJour (1985), and Louis Pojman (1999) have 
seen Wittgenstein as a Contextualist who maintains that 
our inferential beliefs are supported by contextually basic 
beliefs, i.e., beliefs that are basic in some contexts, but not 
in others--a position which seems to open the door to 
relativism. Annis, for example, argues that a belief is 
contextually basic for a person relative to an appropriate 
objector group at a specific time if that group lets the 
person hold the belief without supplying reasons. In 
different contexts, different beliefs are basic, but there is 
no general epistemic criterion for justifying beliefs inde-
pendent of those arising from social practices and social 
approval (1978). I maintain that Wittgenstein is not a 
Contextualist and therefore not subject to the charge of 
relativism.  
The one passage most frequently cited as evidence of 
Wittgenstein's Contextualism is OC 235: "At the foundation 
of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded." (See 
also OC 10, 27, 155, 250, 255, 334-35, 348, 423, 553, 
554, & 622.)  
Such remarks may seem to leave Wittgenstein open to 
the charge of relativism, for a proposition that is certain in 
one context may be uncertain in another. Nonetheless, 
Wittgenstein is not a Contextualist because unlike Annis, 
Wittgenstein has not only a notion of particular contexts, 
but also a notion of a very general context. Wittgenstein 
maintains that criteria function only given certain very 
general facts of nature (including facts about human 
behavior) and certain human customs or general practices. 
He calls this general background context "our inherited 
background" or "world picture" (OC 167) and insists that it 
is necessary for inquiry. Moore's propositions in "A De-
fence of Common Sense" belong to this world picture 
(1959). At this level of generality, certainty is absolute. 
There is room for fluctuation, but not for doubt.  
4. Wittgenstein’s River Analogy 
In On Certainty 94-99, Wittgenstein compares our system 
of beliefs to a river. The flowing waters represent our 
empirical inquiries. These involve forming hypotheses, 
making predictions, gathering data, performing experi-
ments, doubting, checking, and giving grounds. In contrast 
to the flowing water are the hard banks and sandy bottom 
of the river. These are necessary for its existence. Without 
the hard banks guiding the course of the water, there 
would be no river.  
The river's bed and banks represent our foundational 
beliefs, which Wittgenstein calls our "picture of the world" 
and "the inherited background against which I distinguish 
between true and false" (OC 94). Foundational beliefs 
have the "form of empirical propositions" (OC 96), but their 
function is logical. Unlike fluid empirical beliefs, basic 
beliefs have become hardened and function as channels 
guiding the flow of empirical beliefs (OC 96). One advan-
tage of this metaphor over others, such as the pyramid, is 
that it is essentially dynamic: the water is constantly 
flowing. Change is an integral part of the metaphor. The 
relationship between the water and the bank also changes 
over time. Fluid beliefs harden, and hard beliefs become 
fluid (OC 96). This does not mean that all beliefs are 
equally revisable; however, for some basic beliefs are 
more solid than others.  
"And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, 
subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, 
partly of sand, which now in one place now in another 
gets washed away, or deposited" (OC 99). 
Let us consider one example of a belief that changes its 
status: Wittgenstein example “I have never been on the 
moon”. In 1951, this was certain within their system of 
beliefs; a human going to the moon was considered 
physically impossible. Since 1951, that once solid belief 
has become fluid. Humans have been to, and walked on, 
the moon. Consequently, asking whether someone has 
been to, or walked on, the moon today in 2003 makes 
sense in a way it did not in 1951. This belief seems to 
have shifted from being part of the riverbank to being part 
of the sand of the riverbed that has been carried along by 
the water.  
Wittgenstein’s account is beginning to sound like 
Quine's view that all beliefs are in principle revisable. I 
think Wittgenstein would reject this comparison, for while 
he allows some basic beliefs to become empirical and vice 
versa, he insists that at any given time both types of beliefs 
are necessary for the river to exist.  
"But I distinguish between the movement of the waters 
on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though 
there is not a sharp division of one from the other" (OC 
97).  
The movement of the water represents everyday science: 
formulating hypotheses, making predictions, gathering 
data, testing hypotheses, and correcting mistakes. A shift 
of the riverbed itself represents a truly dramatic change, 
perhaps a paradigm shift.  
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5. Conclusion 
I have argued that Wittgenstein's views on the structure of 
justification cannot be categorized as Foundationalist, Ho-
listic Coherentist, or Contextualist. Wittgenstein's remarks 
fit none of these theories, nor can they be seen as an 
attempt to develop some sort of combination theory. Con-
sequently, Wittgenstein has given us a novel model of the 
structure of our belief system.  
Finally, I want to mention a point for which I have argued 
elsewhere (2002). Wittgenstein’s view differs from the 
three individualist theories discussed here in that his 
theory is communal. The traditional theories maintain that 
the belief system of the individual is primary. Whatever 
beliefs the community may have are secondary to those of 
its individual members. Wittgenstein, like many contempo-
rary feminist epistemologists (Nelson, 1993 & Longino, 
1993), maintains that the belief system of the community is 
primary.  
"'We are quite sure of it does not mean just that every 
single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a 
community which is bound together by science and 
education" (OC 298).  
Before we can be trained in science, we must be trained in 
the more basic practices of language use, inquiry, etc. 
Through this more basic training, children unconsciously 
absorb the inherited background beliefs of their commu-
nity, which function as the "matter of course foundation" for 
scientific inquiry (OC 167).  
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